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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The I Haii t curt of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated sections 78-2a-3(2)G) and 78-2-2(4) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This apjvii! pieseiiis tin I allowing issues for review.
Issue #1: Whether .the trial court should liau* }]M»ftal W mi le \ \ Motion for .
Summary Judgment based on the undisputed facts which demonstrated, as a matter of
law, ilull (intton's conduct was outside the course and scope of his independent
contractor relationship

* A uiu\\ ^ui -inui, therefore, be vicariously

liable for Bearden's losses resulting from that conduct.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a denial of summary judgment, the reviewing
court is to "Yonsulei m\\\ w lidlin lite trial court correctly applied the law and correctly
concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed

v

Su t. /1 ! hiderwriters v. E &

C Trucking, 2000 UT 71, f 14, 10 P.3d 338 (quoting Aurora Credit Servs. v. Liberty W.
Dev. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998)). No deference is accorded the trial court's
conclusions of law. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 I»I m 1 I.!, Wo I' 2d 104^ When
reviewing an order denying a motion for summary judgment, appellate c * mrt \ jr 111
review "the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the .. . the nonmoving party." Surely ! Underwriters, 2000 I J I 71 , f 15, 10 P.3d 338.
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 213.
Issue #2: Whether the trial court should have granted Wardley's Motion for
Directed Verdict based on the testimony which demonstrated, as a matter of law, that
247434_2
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Gritton's conduct was outside the course and scope of his independent contractor
relationship with Wardley and Wardley could not, therefore, be vicariously liable for
Bearden's losses resulting from that conduct.
Standard of Review: In reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict, there
is one standard of review: An appellate court will "'reverse only if, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict.'" Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT
77, f 33, 31 P.3d 557 (quoting Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 839 (Utah 1992));
see also Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, f 16, 990 P.2d 933 ("When reviewing any
challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review "'the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds
could disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict.'" (quoting White v. Fox,
665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983))); Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, 52
(Utah 1994); DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) ("A directed
verdict and a judgment n.o.v. are justified only if, after looking at the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 'the trial court
concludes that there is no competent evidence which would support a verdict in his
favor.'" (quoting Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982))).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 708 at 171-75.
Issue #3: Whether the jury was properly instructed regarding the relationship
between Gritton and Wardley; the standard governing Wardley's vicarious liability for
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Gritton's acts; and the appropriate evidentiary standard governing Bearden's claims for
fraud.
Standard of Review: An appeal challenging the jury instructions presents a
question of law with respect to which the trial court is given m > ti< Terence. Ong v. If2
Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,
238 (I lUih \W21 Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989)). Similarly, "Whether
[a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question
of law" which is reviewed for correctness. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.,
2001 11 (

7

1 38, 31 P.3d 557. Nonetheless, appellate courts will affirm the use of the

jury instructions when they "taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury even
where one or more of the instructions, standing along, are not as full oi accurate as they
might have been." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R 708 at 229. The trial court did not
permit counsel an opportunity to completely state his objections lo die |iiry instructions
on the record, contrary to Rule 51(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("Objections to
written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury . . . . The
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections ouiside lin1 hearing of the jury.").
The trial court's refusal to permit Wardley's counsel to fully set forth the bases for his
objections should not preclude consideration of this issue. See Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley
Hospital, 830 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 1992) ("The judge did not afford counsel any
opportunity to enter objections on the record before the jury retire* * vhis court should
not enjoin [the] appeal because of this irregularity by the trial court.").

247434_2
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Issue # 4: Whether the Special Verdict was confusing and improperly tied the
jury's findings of Gritton's fault to Wardley and whether the Special Verdict allowed the
jury to find there was fraud by a preponderance of the evidence.
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court has correctly refused to give a special
verdict form is a question of law. Collins v. Wilson, 1999 UT 56, f 22, 984 P.2d 960
(citing State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 655 (Utah 1995)). Nonetheless, "a court has
considerable discretion in accepting proposed special verdict forms." Id. (citing Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989)).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 708 at 229.
Issue #5: Whether the trial court erred in failing to follow Rule 47(n) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure when the jury had a question regarding the meaning of the
Special Verdict.
Standard of Review: The determination of the propriety of a trial court's
communication with a jury during deliberations is reviewed under a correction-of-error
standard. The trial court will be reversed only if the error is "'substantial or
prejudicial. .. such that the result would have been different had it not taken place.'"
Board of Commissioners of the State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Utah
1997)(quoting Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979)).
This issue was not preserved for appeal but should be considered preserved
because trial counsel was unaware that the jury had submitted a question to the judge
until being informed of that fact by Wardley's current counsel, who did not discover the
issue until the record on appeal was received from the trial court. It was impossible for
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trial counsel to preserve the issue for appeal when he had no knowledge of the issue's
existence.
Issue #6: Whether the evidence supports the judgment for compensatory and
punitive damages awarded against Wardley, in the amount of approximately
$135,000.00.
Standard of Review: Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in their
assessment of damages. See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995) (citing
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985)). A
reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's findings and
will uphold its calculation of damages so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it.
Id.
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 653.
Issue #7: Whether the trial court appropriately awarded attorney fees of
$46,970.19.
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305
(Utah 1998) (citing Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
Similarly, "whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are
sufficient is a question of law, reviewed for correctness." Id. (citing State v. Pharris, 846
P.2d 454, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Once it has been determined that a party is legally
entitled to a fee award, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes
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a reasonable attorney fee. Id. (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988)).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 558.
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL

Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-1, et seq.
See Addendum.
Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Jurors.
Additional instructions ofjury. After the jury have retired for
deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of
law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct
them into court. Upon their being brought into court the
information required must be given in the presence of, or after
notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given
in writing or stated on the record.
Rule 51(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - Instructions to Jury; Objections
(d) Objections to instructions. Objections to written instructions
shall be made before the instructions are given to the jury.
Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The
court shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the
hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an instruction or the
failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned
as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In objecting to the
giving of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to which
the objection is made and the grounds for the objection.

247434_2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arose out of the sale of rental property owned by Lucille Bearden
("Bearden"1) to Gritton, whom Bearden had hired as a real estate agent initially to help
her sell the rental property. Bearden and Gritton agreed he would buy the property on a
contract. Gritton, however, surreptitiously had Bearden sign a Warranty Deed; had the
Warranty Deed improperly notarized and recorded, thereby transferring the title to
himself. In addition to defaulting on the purchase contract, Gritton took out several loans
secured by the property, failing to pay two of them. Bearden, Mr. Bearden and the
Family Trust sued Gritton, his employer, Wardley Corporation, the notary, the title
company for whom the notary worked and the surety on the notary's bond.
Course of Proceedings
The initial Complaint in this case was filed on November 30, 1998 against
Defendants Wardley Corporation and Guy Gritton. (R. 1.) On May 20,1999, an Order
was entered granting Plaintiffs permission to file their Amended Complaint to add as
Defendants Charlene Burns-Nielson, Backman Stewart Title Services Ltd., and Old
Republic Surety Group. (R. 102.) On January 11, 2000, Wardley filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. 213.) No hearing was held, and by minute entry dated April 6,
2000, the trial court denied Wardley's motion, "for the reasons specified in the opposing
memorandum." (R. 305.) An Order to this effect was entered on July 12, 2000.

Unless a distinction is necessary, all of the plaintiffs are referred to collectively as
"Bearden."

247434,2
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(R. 307.) On August 2, 2000, Wardley filed a petition for interlocutory review of the
denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 311), which was denied by the Utah
Supreme Court by its Order dated September 20, 2000. (R. 331.)
By Order dated May 18, 2001, Burns-Neilson, Backman Stewart, and Old
Republic were dismissed from the suit after settling with Plaintiffs. (R. 353.)
A two-day trial was held on September 4-5, 2001. At the close of plaintiffs' case
in chief, Wardley brought a Motion for Directed Verdict. (R. 708 at 171-74.) That
motion was denied. {Id. at 174.) After deliberations, the jury brought back a verdict
against Wardley and Gritton, (R. 471, 475), and on November 13, 2001, the trial court
entered a judgment against Wardley and Gritton in the amount of $75,000, punitive
damages against Gritton in the amount of $25,000, and against Wardley in the amount of
$15,000. (R. 644.) Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and
Prejudgment Interest after the verdict was returned (R. 479-81). Pursuant to this Motion,
the trial court further awarded $1,107.00 in costs, $46,970.19 in attorneys' fees, and
$7,203.00 in prejudgment interest. (R. 644)
Statement of Facts
At all times relevant to this case, Gritton was a real estate agent affiliated with
Wardley through a written independent contractor agreement. (Tr. Ex. 2, 3) In
approximately June of 1997, Bearden engaged Gritton and Wardley to help her sell a
home located at 550 Adams Avenue, Midvale, Utah, which she had been renting out (the
"Property"). (R. 707 at 12.) The parties entered into a Listing Contract and Agency
Disclosure so Gritton could help Lucille sell the Property. {Id. at 15-16; Tr. Ex. 4.)
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Shortly after the Property was placed on the market, Gritton told Lucille that his wife had
asked him to move out and advised Lucille he personally might be interested in
purchasing the Property for $89,000.00. (R. 707 at 19-21, 114-15. Gritton told Bearden
he planned to make improvements to the Property and resell it at a higher price. (Id.
at 19, 114-15.) Bearden agreed to sell Gritton the Property. (Id.)
On July 11, 1997, Gritton came to Bearden's home to have her sign papers relating
to the sale of the Property to him. (Id. at 24, 26-27.) Bearden and Gritton executed a
Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC"), which stated Gritton would purchase the
Property for $89,000. (Id.\ Tr. Ex. 7.) Under the REPC, Bearden agreed to accept
$400.00 per month from Gritton as "interest only" payments while Gritton was living in
the Property and fixing it up. (R. 707 at 20, 114-15.) Gritton was to make a balloon
payment of $89,000 at the end of five years. (Id. at 20; 115.) The REPC required Gritton
to provide a $500 earnest money deposit on or before October 15, 1997. Addendum
No. 1 to the REPC indicates Gritton was purchasing the Property to fix it up and sell it at
a profit. (Tr. Ex. 7.)
At the meeting on July 11, 1997, Gritton handed Bearden papers to be signed or
initialed as Gritton instructed. (R. 707 at 26.) Bearden relied on Gritton's
representations as to the contents of the documents relating to Gritton's purchase of the
Property, and then signed them without reading them. (Id.) In addition to the REPC and
among the documents Bearden apparently signed during that meeting (or at a meeting
five days later) was a Warranty Deed purporting to transfer title to the Property from
Bearden to Gritton. (Tr. Ex. 9.) Gritton did not disclose that he was having Bearden sign
247434_2
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a Warranty Deed and Bearden did not realize that she was signing a Warranty Deed to the
Property. (R. 707 at 27.)
The Warranty Deed was later notarized by Charlene Burns-Nielson, who did not
witness Bearden's signature. (R. 708 at 179.) The Warranty Deed with its improper
notarization was recorded by Gritton several months later. (R. 707 at 137, 143.) Gritton
did not tell Bearden he had recorded the Warranty Deed (id. at 149) and, in fact, their
agreement did not call for title to transfer until after Gritton had fully paid for the
Property. (Id. at 27-28.)
Gritton moved into the Property and sporadically made the monthly payments
required by the REPC. (R. 707 at 32-33.) In total, Gritton paid Bearden $3,200, and did
not make any payments after May of 1998, although he remained in the house until
November 3, 1998. (Id.) Eventually, Bearden contacted an attorney to look into getting
copies of the papers she had signed with Gritton and getting Gritton to make the
promised payments. (Id. at 34.) Bearden's attorney discovered that title to the Property
had been transferred to Gritton and that large liens had been placed against the Property.
(Id. at 35.) The loans Gritton had taken went into foreclosure. (Id. at 37.) Bearden was
able to pay Gritton's loans off and save the home from being sold at public sale by
borrowing nearly $60,000 and arranging for the Deed of Trust held by Gritton's lender to
be transferred and assigned to her. (Id.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), is no
longer good law, the trial court erred by not assessing Wardley's right to control the real
estate agent, Gritton, to determine whether he was an "employee" or an independent
contractor of Wardley.
With respect to Bearden's claims that Wardley should be vicariously liable,
reasonable minds could not disagree that the actions of Gritton were not within 1) the
scope of his employment, 2) his apparent authority, or 3) the scope of his subagency with
his broker, Wardley. Although Gritton had been given limited authority to undertake
certain actions with respect to helping buyers and sellers of real property, such as
Bearden, with marketing their properties, Gritton did not, under any agency theory, have
authority to fraudulently obtain Bearden's signature on a Warranty Deed, and have it
notarized and recorded, so that he could then obtain several loans by securing them with
Bearden's property - all for his personal benefit. Gritton's lack of authority to do the
very acts of which Bearden complains, should have prevented this case from going to the
jury on the issue of Wardley's vicarious liability.
Under the traditional three-part test established in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111
P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989), Gritton's actions were not within the scope of his
employment, or the scope of his subagency, with Wardley. Although Gritton's used his
legitimate real estate activities "as a springboard," Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387,
1391 (Utah 1995), for his fraudulent actions, the actions he took to defraud Bearden were
not the general kind of activities a real estate agent performs. In addition, they were not

11

intended to further Wardley's interest but, rather, as Gritton testified, to serve solely his
own private and personal interests.
There was no basis for finding Gritton had apparent authority to defraud Bearden
because Wardley took no steps which might reasonably be found to cause third parties to
believe that Gritton was clothed with apparent authority to purchase property for his own
account. Gritton was only authorized to act as Wardley's agent in a limited capacity.
Bearden's sole and exclusive reliance on Gritton for a claim that Gritton had apparent
authority is wrong.
Wardley's inquiries about this listing elicited lies and deceit from Gritton. Being
thus kept in the dark, there was no reason for Wardley to have taken any of the aggressive
actions suggested by Bearden in an effort to protect Bearden. The fraud and the harm
were unanticipated. In fact, Bearden had an obligation to ascertain the scope of the
authority she supposed Gritton had. There is no basis to impute Gritton's knowledge to
Wardley.
One of the problems with this case is that the instructions to the jury unnecessarily
confused Gritton's actions with the actions and statements of Wardley in a way that was
prejudicial to Wardley. The trial court essentially told the jury that Gritton's acts could
bind Wardley because Wardley, as a corporation, could only act through its agents.
For the same reasons articulated in connection with Wardley's scope of
employment argument, above, Gritton's conduct was not within the scope of his
subagency relationship with Wardley. Wardley can only be held responsible for those
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things its agent does which are within the scope of the agent's employment or in the
course of carrying out the duties assigned to the agent.
Wardley cannot be held directly liable for the results of Gritton's fraud based on a
claimed breach of fiduciary its duty. Wardley could not have anticipated Gritton's
fraudulent scheme largely due to Gritton's lies and deceit practiced on Wardley. No
evidence was submitted as to an applicable standard of care, leaving the jury to
apparently make one up.
Likewise, Wardley cannot be held directly liable for punitive damages. There is
no doubt that Wardley did not act in a sufficiently culpable manner to warrant being held
responsible for punitive damages based on its own conduct. Rather, it appears that the
jury attributed Gritton's conduct to Wardley. This appears to have been the result of the
lower court's confusing jury instructions. There was no evidence of any act by any
person must sufficiently high-up in the Wardley organization to justify holding the
corporation responsible. The only evidence regarding willful, malicious, or reckless
conduct was that of Gritton.
The Special Verdict form used by the court prejudiced Wardley because it
instructed the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard for determining fraud. In
addition, when the jury had a follow up question, the trial judge failed to call the
attorneys back to the court as required by Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Finally, the jury's calculation of damages is not supported by competent evidence.
The basis of the jury's damage award is a mystery, even to Bearden's counsel, with the
247434_2
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final figure appearing to have been pulled out of thin air. In addition, according to
Bearden's supposition as to how they arrived at a number, the jury held Wardley
vicariously liable for Gritton's rent, failed to credit $3,200 Gritton paid the Bearden and
clearly did not account for account for damages caused by the settling defendants,
Backman Stuart Title Company, Charlene Burns-Nielson, and the Old Republic Surety
Group.

ARGUMENT
Wardley believes this case presents a factual setting where none of the various
theories promoted by Bearden were sufficient to hold Wardley vicariously liable for
Gritton fraudulently obtaining Bearden's signature on a Warranty Deed, having it
illegally notarized, recording it and fraudulently obtaining several loans secured by the
Property effectively stolen from Bearden - all for his personal benefit.
This court's recent decision in Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon,
2001 UT App 48, 21 P.3d 235, is instructive in disposing of Bearden's suppositions. In
Cannon, Wardley's agent, Aries Hansen ("Hansen"), signed four listing agreements with
the Mascaros. Id. at f 2. The first listing agreement was set to expire the next day,
November 15, 1993. Id. The expiration dates on the other three listing agreements were
left blank. Id. Hansen, after obtaining the Mascaros' signatures, and without their
knowledge or approval, fraudulently altered the expiration date on the first of the four
listing agreements (changing the expiration date from November 15, 1993 to November
15, 1994), and unilaterally filled in the blank expiration dates on the three other listing
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agreements with the same fraudulent date. Id. Unaware, the Mascaros listed the property
in September 1994 with Cannon's real estate brokerage company and, when it was sold
shortly thereafter, Cannon was paid the commission. Id. Wardley, ignorant of Hansen's
fraud, sued for the commission under what it thought were extant listing agreements. Id.

atI3.
At trial, the court concluded that Wardley's listing agreements were voidable and
unenforceable due to Hansen's fraud. Id. Cannon and the Mascaros then requested
attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. This request was denied. Id. at
14. Cannon appealed, arguing that pursuant to principles of vicarious liability, Hansen's
fraudulent actions should be imputed to Wardley, thus making Wardley's suit "without
merit" and "not brought or asserted in good faith," and entitling Cannon to attorney fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Id.
In Cannon, the Court of Appeals rejected Cannon's vicarious liability theory. Id.
at \ 11. The court refused to extend the holding of Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d
151 (Utah 1991), and thereby expand the scope of vicarious liability.
In distinguishing Hodges, the Cannon court noted that the knowledge of the
agent/employee "could be imputed to his employer only if [the agent/employee] acted
within the scope of his authority and was motivated at least in part to carry out the
employer's purposes." 2001 UT App 48, f 9, 21 P.3d 235 (footnote omitted). In a
footnote addressing the scope of the real estate agent's authority, the court noted:
Hansen may have had authority to enter into the listing
agreements with the Mascaros; however, he did not, under any
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agency theory, have authority to fraudulently change the dates on
those agreements.
Id. at f 9 n. 5 (emphasis added).
Similarly, here, although Gritton had authority to enter into the Listing Contract
and Agency Disclosure with Bearden (Tr. Ex. 4), he did not, "under any agency theory,
have authority to fraudulently" obtain Bearden's signature on the Warranty Deed, and
have it notarized and recorded, so that he could then obtain several loans by securing
them with Bearden's property - all for his personal benefit. Gritton's clear lack of
authority to do that of which Bearden complains, should have prevented this case from
going to the jury on the issue of Wardley being vicariously liable for Gritton's fraudulent
activities - whether in the context of Bearden's subagency, apparent authority or
respondeat superior theories, or being directly liable for breaching its fiduciary duty.
MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE.
Because Wardley challenges a trial court's ruling concerning a motion for a
directed verdict and questions the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's
conclusions as to Wardley's vicarious liability, it is required to '"marshal the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, 111,
448 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001 UT 77,
f 33, 31 P.3d 557 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. 24(a)(9).
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Gritton's Relationship With Wardley.
1. Gritton, as a real estate agent with Wardley pursuant r^ - Tuly 1 - ' °°7
Broker-Siiles F:\milivv (Vnh"'»i'(',ni,,l|*(,ndriil l'"onlm lui A;.,iiinin.,ni fir \l\
authorized to perform certain iJt,

,!

i w.is

work on behalf of Wardley. (Id.) Such w ork

included the solicitation of real estate related service contracts to be taken in the name of
Wartlic -

Id)
2.

Real estate agents and brokers represent or act on behalf of individuals

buying or selling real property And llic job of an agent or broker Is to help them buy or
sell |uoperl>

\\< ON Jill l<>N |

3.

Wardlrv provided (Jiillon winIIIIIi

a

.111 office;

c. a name tag with Wardlej "s ^
d. access to secretaries, a reception] si, and . iiici

-Mjuve and support

staff;
e. I rim phone service;
f. aa.oiJiilifig sen ices;
g. signs, which Wnrdley required to have the Wardley name;
1

i inagaziik1 I'll

Iiidi agents could advertise properties;

i

a television program on which agents could advertise properties;

j

ads In newspaper* . . •. .uch agents c^uo ^Kertise open 1 louses;

k. other agents wit1, "'horn to network;
1.
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access to the local

r\c Listing Service ("MI ,S";

m. forms, such as the Listing Agreement (Tr. Ex. 4), the Real Estate Purchase
Contract (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23) and the Under Contract Information Sheet (Tr. Ex. 10), which
bore the Wardley logo; and
n. opportunities for training.
(R. 707 at 103-06; R. 708 at 199-200, 201-03, 211.)
The Listing Agreement With Bearden.
4. In June of 1997, Gritton solicited business from Bearden, whom he had
known growing up (R. 707 at 8) and from church. {Id. at 8-9.) Bearden agreed to use
Gritton as her agent at least in part because he worked for Wardley, which Bearden
recognized as a reputable real estate broker. {Id. at 13, 17.)
5. The two parties discussed Gritton acting as Bearden's real estate agent and
Gritton convinced Bearden she should sell a home she owned at 550 Adams Avenue,
Midvale, Utah ("the Property"). (R. 707 at 13.)
6. Bearden knew other properties in her area were selling for $125,000
(R. 707 at 17), but Gritton convinced her to sell the Property for $89,000. {Id. at 16, 17.)
The Property was listed for $89,000.00. (Tr. Ex. 4; R. 707 at 19-20, 111.)
7. Gritton signed a Listing Agreement on behalf of Wardley, (Tr. Ex. 4;
R. 707 at 16, 109; R. 708 at 218), on a form provided by Wardley. (R. 707 at 117.) As
Wardley's client, Bearden was owed a fiduciary duty by Wardley. (R. 707 at 110-11;
R. 708 at 219.)
8. Bearden did not read the Listing Agreement before she signed it. (R. 707
at 46) Bearden did not really understand the limited agency provisions in Section 6.
(R. 707 at 46, 47, 50-51,69.)
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9. She could not recall if Gritton ever explained the limited agencj provisions
to her (R. 707 at 69) and neither could Gritton, (R. 707 ,il 159-160; 166-67.)
M a r k e t i n g Bearden's Property,
10. Shortly after the Property wa^ placed on the market, Gritton received an
offer for $89,000.00 from, a young couple m buy Bearden's Property, but they reneged a
< implr ml d*i\ s bin

111 II ill I \ >') '

•

I

11. Shortly after that deal fell through, Onuui * •

.
"

•

.
l

. •
1

purchase the Property on the same conditions as the young couple - for $89,000.00.
(

12 r
pd\iininl in li

,ien agreed to ac
^

u* <nh i n *m Untton with a balloon
.. v\as ie>, < u..*.. ^.\L ,aJ heeh gelling from

renters (id.), uiiu. I C ^ uian &hc nau i licated si
disclosure form Gritton helped her fill < usi

Id. at 23; Tr. Ex. _., v o~ dial lorm, Gr^oii

and Beai den had agreed that if Seller financing was selected by a buyer, the purchase
price would be $95,0011 <M|h "'in

.IHM (ii1 >nn M*<.| >«u) I|I I»• Li»u "< '»,"" "

i"

years. (Tr, Ex, 5.))
13. The $41)0,01) rniiiithly payment did not equal the 10% interest payment
il 1 mi I mii Unl nn ihf Ml *' i itiisii hMiir Inrin 11-1 II ,il I I i Id I
14. Gritton and Bearden agreed that she would retain title in her name until the
balloon payment was made. (R. 707 at 21.)
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15. Gritton came to Bearden's home on July 11, 1997 to have her sign papers
related to the sale of her Property to him. (R. 707 at 24.) As they talked about family
and old friends, Gritton handed Bearden papers to be signed or initialed, as Gritton
instructed. (Id. at 26.)
16. Bearden did not read any of the documents. (Id.) Gritton was explaining
them to her, and told her he would take care of her. (Id.) Bearden relied on Gritton's
representations as to the contents of these documents and then signed them without
reading them. (Id.)
17. She signed the documents because she trusted him. (Id. at 9, 26, 63, 64,
66.) She trusted Gritton because she knew him and his family (id. at 9, 64), they
belonged to the same church, (id. at 9), and because he worked for a reputable broker,
Wardley. (Id. at 63, 70-71.)
The Real Estate Purchase Contract Between Gritton and Bearden,
18. During this meeting, Bearden signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("the
REPC") (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 26-27), on a form provided by Wardley. (R. 707
at 117.)
19. The REPC stated Gritton would purchase the Property for $89,000. (Tr.
Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 117-18.) The REPC required Gritton to provide a $500 earnest
money deposit on or before October 15,1997. (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23; R. 707 at 118.)
20. The REPC clearly identified Gritton as the buyer. (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23.)
21. Although the REPC discloses that both Gritton and Wardley were
representing both sides of the transaction (Tr. Ex. 7/Ex. 23 at f 5), Bearden did not really
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understand the limited agency provisions. (R. 707 at 46, 47, 50-51, oy.; S:v - •
understand that Gritton's or Wardley's duties were to her were going u> change. J\
a

1

\r

)

22. GriUoii |>iu\ iUcd a copy of the REPC to Wardley ' ~ '>\im\ capacity as
Wardlev s jf>i'iil il«

in , I II I I ' ( i ' I I " » i

23. A file was created, accord m:: f > Wardle\ - noli*

t

v 'as Wardley's policy to review the document in these iransac lion file as part of its

24.11ms Wardlev
~ irden and that he was acting as both Wardley's real estate agent representing the
seller, and as the- buyer of :IK Property. (R 707 at 121, 123; R. 708 at 195.)
1ll,,

i W-inlln lull ipiilii '. aiuiM'sl d'.'cnts iliiiuii" ptopnties the\ had listed.

(R. 708 at 215-16.) Gritton was not aware of this polic\

i i«"' 'I I " i l l I" ^ )

26. This policy was considered to be in the best interests of Wardley's clients
11

"I'TS, ill ,1" I ' t . 11111. .ilioulJ lia\c Lduscd \\ a id ley some concern ( M a t 223.)
27. No one at Wardley evei u j ! -

asked him to stop representing Bearden

v

u" a ;

; n.iis loii/ihiiuhinl
28. No OIK1 a( W; \i, .

tii

•.

;

4 152, io8; R. 708 at 224., *n

1:>2-O3.)

.. _ .

,.MIUIIC

or asked another agent to step in and represent Bearden. (R. 708 at 224.) i
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agent

agreed to buy the Property, Gritton felt like he was in a buyer-seller situation, not an
agency situation. (R. 707 at 167.)
29. Wardley established a trust account for this transaction. (R. 708 at 215,
222; Tr. Ex. 12.)
30. Gritton did not make the $500 earnest money deposit required by the
REPC. (R. 707 at 118.)
31. It was Wardley's policy that earnest money should be turned in and
deposited in the trust account within 24 hours. (R. 708 at 223.)
32. Wardley was aware that Gritton failed to make the earnest money payment
to Bearden, as required by the REPC. (Tr. Ex. 12; R. 708 at 222.)
33. After the REPC was signed, Gritton prepared a Wardley approved form:
"Under Contract Information Sheet." (Tr. Ex. 10; R. 707 at 121-23, 125.) Gritton
provided a copy of the Under Contract form to Wardley in Gritton's capacity as
Wardley's agent. (R. 707 at 125.)
34. It was Wardley's policy to place the under contract information sheet in the
tracking file. (R. 707 at 122-23, 125; R. 708 at 213-15, 221-22.)
35. And again, Wardley's policy to review the documents once placed in the
tracking file. (R. 708 at 213-15, 221-22.)
36. Wardley sent Gritton an undated Reminder Notice requesting the earnest
money and other documentation, and congratulating him on his sale. (Tr. Ex. 11.)
Someone on behalf of Wardley wrote: "Way to go!" at the bottom of that sheet. (R. 707
at 152-53; Tr. Ex. 11.)
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37.Gritton wras notified by Wardley that the RLPC •• * J rxpinnl 'hi1'" in • 'MMftV
money deposit had been received, and was asked to provide an appropriately modified
and signal Rl'.h

iI K

I" -

Gritton's Fraudulent Obtaining a Warranty Deed,
38. Among ihe documents Bearden signed during the July 1 : * > r r \u\ ting
v ;i iWnrjinh I

.

.. :,.

.w[vi;. uvm bcunien to Uritton

(Tr.Ex.9.)
39 Bearden does not recall signing any Warranty Deed. (R. 707 at 27.) She is
i, I

•

^

.u . iLxaiieasi^nine i; iKcause she has dealt with such documents

before. (Id,)
* ™ ;re is no dispute that Gritton fraudulently had Bearden *.M«» the Warranty
Deed fR „!J^, J<>4.)
•I I "I i i"il I (mi

in/lion,"-. .11 in, I rcprrsenl.ilions \MIII respects »: his purchase ol the

Property from Bearden were intentional and fraudulent. (R. 2J:< ''M
42. (JI if ton did not disclose to Bearden that he had fii^d a Chapter 13
: -;

• * • • • ' -

.:-..' ^ agreed to pui-Jia.^v. iv,. Pioperty

(R. 707 at 139), that a federal tax lien had
\ alley at the time (id. at 140-41"; or thai his former brokerage company was suing him
against on ,.*.> ....

<

,*</ at 141.)

43. Gritton tried to obtain financing foi Jus
another lender, but was unable to because of his financial situation. (Id, at 142.)
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44. During the meeting on July 11, 1997, at which Bearden signed the
documents, Bearden asked to have her attorney review the papers. Gritton told her that
would not be necessary as Wardley had an attorney who would look everything over and
make sure everything was all right. (Id. at 27-28.)
45. Bearden also noticed that one of the documents required her signature to be
notarized. (Id. at 28-29.) Because the top of the document was covered up, she did not
see what it was. (Id. at 29.) When Bearden offered to go to a notary just down the street,
Gritton assured Bearden that a notary at Wardley's offices would handle the notarization.
(Id. at 29-30.)
46. The Warranty Deed was later notarized by a notary who did not witness
Bearden's signature. (R. 708 at 179.)
47. Gritton did not leave copies of the papers, but told Bearden that he would
send them to her when everything was in order. (R. 707 at 31.) Although Bearden made
several calls to Gritton to get copies, Gritton made up excuses and she was never
provided copies of the papers she had signed. (Id. at 31.)
48. During the meeting on July 11, 1997, Gritton mentioned that both he and
Wardley were to receive a commission as a result of the Bearden transaction. (R. 707
at 30.) Bearden understood that the commissions were to be paid out of the purchase
price. (Id. at 30.)
49. An Addendum No. 1 to the REPC was presented by Gritton to Bearden.
(Tr. Ex. 8.) Although her signature to the Addendum was dated July 16, 1998, she
remembers signing all of the papers on the same day. (R. 707 at 58-59.)
247434_2
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50. Addendum No. 1 reflects a reduction i
which was to reflect the 6% commission. ($89,000
]M,

'

|.|

1(1 ' ,1

1 ill

Il

^

*),

^ ; commission = $83,000; Kli.

II li| i. 1

51. Gritton provided n . , ' p "" "•

Vdlntili,

N

W,""",

hl *<»7

at 123.) \gain. this was done in his capacity as Wardley's agent. {Id. at 125.)
Gritton Fraudulently Obtained Loans Secured by Bearden's Property,
52.The Warranty Deed with ils ini| lopn n l.iri.Mlinii was IYM oidnl In1 l tiidmi
several months later. (/J. at 137; 143.) Grittoii still worked for Wardley when he
recorded

.; nu

did not tell Bearden he had recorded the Warranty

Deed. (Id
53 Bearden's agreement with Gritton did not call for title to transfoi until aflni
Gritton had fully paid for the Property. (Id. at 27-28.)
f

Rocky Mountain Financial, Li_.v_, u^

, uritton borrowed the sum of $32,020 from.

ie Proper

if \*i 44, 146-4" x--*......,

. w<v v initon borrowed an additional $17,000 from

xvockyMountain, agum HMHJ mr Hupr-iiy ;i,\ i, Pihi'nj! (Ti I „, IX, L! , (I, ji I IS )
56. When Gritton tailed to make payments on the loans, ROCK Mountain
commenced foreclosure proceedings (R. 707 at 143-44, 146-47 ' ' ~
oreclosur.
R 707 al 79-81, 89-90, 146.)
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Bearden Discovers Gritton's Fraud,
58. Gritton was staying at the Property within a short time after the July 11,
1997 meeting. (Id. at 31.) He made the first monthly payments in October, as required
by the REPC. (Id. at 32.) The next four payments (November, Decemiber, January 1998
and February 1998) were made after Bearden called and reminded Gritton. (Id. at 32.)
59. In May 1998, Gritton brought a check from his church and paid for March,
April and May, 1998. (Id. at 33.)
60. In all, Gritton only paid Bearden $3,200, and he has not made any
payments since May of 1998. (Id. at 32-33.)
61. When Gritton stopped making payments, Bearden tried to call him several
times at Wardley's offices in June, July and August, 1998. (Id. at 33.) Bearden was told
Gritton was not in. (Id. at 34.) She was not told that Gritton was no longer affiliated with
Wardley. (W.at34.)
62. At no time during the course of the transaction was Bearden ever notified
by Gritton, Wardley or any of Wardley's representatives that Gritton was no longer
authorized to act as a Wardley agent. (Id. at 34, 39.)
63. Bearden's telephone number appears on the documents Gritton submitted
to Wardley. (Tr. Ex. 10; R. 707 at 124.)
64. At no time during the course of the transaction - including the time at
which Gritton was notified by Wardley that the REPC had expired for lack of earnest
money - did anyone from Wardley other than Gritton contact Bearden to investigate the
status of the transaction between Gritton and Bearden. (R. 707 at 34, 39.)

1A1A1A

1
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65. Bearden finally contacted an attorney to look m n vrilini' i opn>i i ( ml
papers she had signed and getting Gritton to make the promised payments. (R. 707
ilu1 ink1 HI ilit1 hoperty had been transferred to Gritton (R , 707

ai

at 35) and that large liens had been placed n^niisf
66. In order to avoid foreclosure, Bearden was required to take out two loans.
(Iii .nil lM -1) / i I liese loans were used to pay off the loans Gritton had taken out using the
property us eolhfVLil

Hv Ins' l.un w i>, "ii1 d • .mumn "I 1AI11 "10 " i

1 \ ," I i I lie

second loan was in the amount of $9,621.15. (Tr. Ex. 22.)
6 7. A day or so before the sale, Bearden was able to pay Gritton's loans off and
save •

)
~w. w-^on moved out on Novem

K UIL: unit i

to do so by the lower court. (R. 210; R. 70 at 150.)
Benefit to Wardlev
69, Although Wardley received no comn •
transaction (R. 707 at 129), Gritton repeatedly demanded ihai i^ch a commission be puAJ
ivy H'Midm, ami B/jitlni (iilnidctl lo do so had Gritton ever paid the agreed upon
purchase price of the home. (M. at 30.)

I.

»UUDL
In denying Wardley's Motion for Summary Jiuh:r

*n

;ne reasoning set forth in the Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's
Judgment ( Memory
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n
:>position'

filed by Beau:.

Central both to Bearden's argument and, therefore, the trial court's ruling, was the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. J CM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah
1983). Because Phillips is no longer good law, the lower court's denial of Wardley's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed.
In Phillips, the court found that Utah's statutory system pertaining to real estate
brokers and salespersons contained "numerous implications of an employer-employee
relationship." 666 P.2d at 881. As noted by Bearden, the Phillips decision determined
that "based on Utah's statutory scheme governing the profession, [the real estate] Agent
was an 'employee' of Broker. Thus, Broker was responsible for the tortious actions of
Agent which were done within the course and scope of employment."2 (R. 270.)
However, the statutory scheme relied upon by the court in Phillips was amended
shortly after that decision was announced to specifically allow for an independent
contractor relationship The references to "employment" and "employed" in Utah Code
Ann. § 61-2-8, upon which the Phillips court relied were eliminated. See L. 1985,
ch. 162 § 2.
Prior to 1985, and at the time of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Phillips,
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3 defined a "real estate salesman" as "any person employed or
engaged by or on behalf of a licensed real estate broker." Phillips, 666 P.2d at 881

2

As further noted by Bearden, "[i]n reaching its decision, the Court did not rely on
the subagency theory. Instead, it concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to
find that Agent had acted within the scope of his employment. Thus, the question of
subagency was moot." (Memorandum in Opposition, R. 270-71.) Bearden's argument
that Gritton was a subagent of Wardley is addressed below.
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employee and Wardley "could not be found vicariously liable for his tortious conduct."
Id. at 1385. See also Thompson v. Jess 1999 UT 22, f 13, 979 P.2d 322 (employer of
independent contractor not liable for harm caused by contractor or his servants where
employer does not control means of accomplishing work).
Thus, the trial court erred in not analyzing or even addressing whether the
relationship between Wardley and Gritton was employer-employee, or whether Wardley
exercised a sufficient degree of control over Gritton as an independent contractor so as to
hold Wardley responsible for Gritton's conduct. For these reasons, the denial of
summary judgment should be reversed.
II.

WARDLEY CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
GRITTON'S FRAUD.
Bearden sought and the jury found Wardley was vicariously liable for Gritton's

fraud based on three theories: 1) respondeat superior, 2) apparent authority; and
3) subagency. Whether viewed from the vantage of Wardley's principal-agent
(employer-employee) relationship with Gritton, or its principal-agent relationship with
Bearden - with Gritton acting as its subagent - reasonable minds could not disagree with

of payment (i.e., wages versus payment for a completed job or
project); and (iv) the furnishing of equipment.
923 P.2d at 1385-86 (citing Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1996)).
Considerable testimony was presented which established that Gritton was an
independent contractor: there was a written agreement to that effect (Tr. Ex. 3 at f 1);
Gritton had no mandatory hours (R. 707 at 155); no obligation to attend meetings (id.
at 155-56); Wardley did not control how he did his job - finding buyers and sellers or
marketed properties (id.)\ Wardley did not withhold taxes for Gritton (id. at 157); did not
pay for Gritton's license fees or costs of marketing. (Id.)
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is so clearly within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot
differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." Christensen v. Swenson, 874
P.2d 125 (Utah 1994) (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah
1991), and Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1057). The lower court should have granted Wardley's
motion for summary judgment and motion for directed verdict. This Court should
overturn the jury's verdict.
1.

Gritton's Conduct Was Not of the General Kind He Was
Employed to Perform,

In denying Wardley's motion for summary judgment, the trial court effectively
expanded the scope of the second Birkner factor5 to swallow the first Birkner factor. Just
because the wrongful act was performed within the physical and spatial boundaries of
employment, or in connection with the legitimate activities of an employee, does not
result in liability, if that conduct was not within the general kind the employee is
employed to perform.
In an effort to satisfy the first prong of Birkner, Bearden argued that, as a real
estate agent, the services Gritton provided on behalf of Wardley include helping
individuals buy or sell real property and, therefore, Gritton's effort to buy real property
on his own behalf did not remove him from his role as Wardley's agent. This approach
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
5

The second Birkner factor requires a finding that "the employee's conduct must
occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the
employment." 771 P.2d at 1056-57. This factor was conceded by Wardley in the court
below and in this court.

11

In Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995), the court held that Mr.
Righter's employer was not vicariously liable for Righter's alienation of the affections of
another employee whom Righter supervised. In that case, Righter's job included
supervising and managing employees - specifically, "hiring, evaluating, promoting, and
firing employees." 891 P.2d at 1389. Righter was the immediate supervisor of Jackson,
the woman who was the object of his affections and he had authority "to promote,
evaluate, train, and give raises to Mrs. Jackson." Id. at 1391.
The evidence in Righter was that Righter's affections had been shown by
promoting Jackson, authorizing her to record unworked overtime hours as an unofficial
raise, and giving her substantial bonuses. Id. at 1392. In addition, the tortious conduct
took place "during a formal employee evaluation in [Righter's] office. Id. at 1391.
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that Righter's alleged acts were part of "of the general
kind [he was] employed to perform," the court focused on the specific wrongful acts
which allegedly caused plaintiff's harm:
Mr. Righter was not authorized to use his supervisory position to
engage in a romantic relationship with his subordinates. His
romantic advances were not a part of his duties but amounted to
an abandonment of the supervisory and managerial
responsibilities he was hired to perform.
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Id. at 1391. Thus, the fact that Righter "used his company duties as a springboard for
pursuing his relationship with Mrs. Jackson," id. at 1391, did not result in vicarious
liability for his employer.6
The same focus on the specific conduct which caused the harm at issue was
evident in J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). In J.H. by D.H.,
the court held that a police officer's sexual molestations of a youth under his supervision
was clearly outside the scope of employment because the officer's acts were not of the
kind and nature he was employed to perform. Id. at 123. The second prong of the
Birkner test was satisfied - the molestations occurred while the police officer was on
duty, performing his assigned duties supervising the Law Enforcement Explorer Scout
program organized by the City and in a City-owned patrol car knowingly used to
transport participants the explorer program activities. Id. at 123. However, the first
prong was not.
As in Righter, the plaintiff asserted that because the officer was employed to
instruct and supervise youth and his wrongful actions were carried out pursuant to this
type of instruction and supervision, the City should be liable. The court again rejected
this approach "because it is not the instruction and supervision by [the officer] of which
[plaintiff] now complains." Id. The court noted:
6

Because Righter affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer, the court viewed the facts and the inferences therefrom, in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. 891 P.2d at 1391. In addition, since the scope of employment
analysis is ordinarily a question of fact, the court had to determine that the employee's
conduct was "so clearly outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot
differ." Id. (citations omitted).
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[The officer] was not hired or authorized to instruct the explorers
in sexual matters, nor was he authorized to touch the explorers in
any manner. His acts of molestation were not in any way part of
the instruction and supervision of the explorers but were in fact a
complete abandonment of that instruction and of his employment.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 2001 UT
App 48,19, fn. 5 (although the real estate agent "may have had authority to enter into the
listing agreements with the [Seller]; however, he did not, under any agency theory, have
authority to fraudulently change the dates on those agreements.").
Here, Gritton was not hired or authorized to purchase property for his own use and
benefit; prepare and record warranty deeds (a function handled by title companies); take
out loans secured by real property; or fail to repay loans. Real estate agents in general are
not hired to do such things. Gritton's conduct in this case amounted to a complete
abandonment of the responsibilities he was contracted to perform. The fact that he used
his position with Wardley "as a springboard," is no reason to hold Wardley liable. On
these issues, reasonable minds cannot differ.
2.

Gritton's Fraudulent Conduct Was Not Motivated Even in Part
by the Purpose of Serving Wardley's Interest,

Although Wardley does not need to defeat another of the three Birkner factors,
D.D.Z. v. Molerway Freight Lines, Inc., 880 P.2d at 4, Bearden has also failed to
establish that Gritton was acting, even in part, for Wardley's benefit. The court in
Birkner explained what was needed to satisfy this requirement:
If the employee acts "from purely personal motives . . . in no way
connected with the employer's interests" or if the conduct is
"unprovoked, highly unusual, and quite outrageous," then the
master is not liable.
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771 P.2d at 1057 (quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 70,
at 506 (5th ed. 1984)). In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court noted:
An employee's conduct is usually not in the scope of employment
where the employee's motivation for the activity is personal, even
though some transaction of business or performance of duty may
also occur.
891 P.2d at 1391 (citations omitted).
Significantly, like the tortfeasor in Jackson, Gritton admitted that he acted solely
and exclusively for his own benefit. While this fact was disputed in consideration of
Wardley's summary judgment motion (R. 235, 264), it was established at trial by
testimony from Gritton:
Q
Did you have any intent to benefit Wardley in taking
out those loans?
A

No.

Q
Did you have any intent to benefit Wardley when you
had the warranty deed prepared?
A

No.

Q

What about when the warranty deed was recorded?

A

No.

(R. 707 at 164.)
No evidence was presented that Gritton was motivated in any way whatsoever to
benefit Wardley with any of these acts. The only evidence Bearden introduced was that:
• Gritton mentioned that both he and Wardley were to receive a commission as a
result of the Bearden transaction. (R. 707 at 30.)
• Bearden understood that the commissions were to be paid out of the purchase
price. (Id.)

1A1AT\A ?
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•

Gritton repeatedly demanded that a commission be paid to Wardley by
Bearden, and that Bearden intended to do so had Gritton ever paid the agreed
upon purchase price of the home. (Id.)

While it presented no testimony at trial, in connection with Wardley's Motion for
Summary Judgment Bearden took the position that:
•

Wardley received the benefit of having an agent who appeared to be effectively
selling property for its clients. (R. 282.)

•

Bearden recommended and expressed her general satisfaction with both
Wardley and Gritton to her friends, associates, and family following the
supposed sale on July 11, 1999. (R. 282, 285-86.)

All of these facts, however, go to the underlying real estate transaction, not the fraud for
which Bearden wants to hold Wardley responsible.
Although Gritton's misconduct took place in connection with his legitimate
activities as a real estate agent for Wardley, his fraudulent actions were not the general
kind of activities a real estate agent performs. In addition, they were not intended to
further Wardley's interest but, rather, as Gritton testified, to serve solely the private and
personal interests of Gritton.
B.

Wardley Never Clothed Gritton With Apparent Authority,

The main fallacy of Bearden's apparent authority argument is that "'[a]n agent's
apparent... authority flows only from the acts and conduct of the principal.'" Bodell
Construction Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988))
(emphasis added). The Bodell court continued to quote from Zions:
"The authority of the agent [is not] 'apparent' merely because it
looks so to the person with whom he deals. It is the principal who
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must cause third parties to believe that the agent is clothed with
apparent authority
It follows that one who deals exclusively
with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that agent's
authority despite the agent's representations/'
Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124, (quoting Zions (quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans ChryslerPlymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90) (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added). As the court in Zions noted,
"liability is premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and acquiescence in the
conduct of its agent which has led third parties to rely upon the agent's actions." 762
P.2d at 1095 (emphasis added).
Here, Wardley only authorized Gritton to act as its Agent in a limited capacity.
(Tr. Ex. 3 and Ex. 4.) See Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124 (noting that First Title was Stewart
Title's agent for a "limited purpose.") Bearden relied on Gritton's statements about the
scope of Wardley's involvement, not Wardley's. No one from Wardley told her that its
attorney's would review all of the papers Gritton asked her to sign; Gritton did. (R. 707
at 28; 65-66.) No one from Wardley told her that its notary would certify her signature
on any of the papers Gritton asked her to sign; Gritton did. (Id. at 30.) Bearden did not
ask Wardley to ensure that Gritton would pay his debt to her - she trusted Gritton. (Id.
at 66.) She did not ask Wardley to confirm the financial information Gritton had given
her. (Id. at 67.) Rather, she "trusted him;" "accepted his word." (Id. (emphasis added).)
Furthermore, Wardley was unaware of several crucial facts. Although Wardley
knew Gritton was acting as a purchaser of a property he listed, in violation of company
policy, it knew that no earnest money had been paid and, when Wardley inquired about
this problem, it was told that the deal had failed. (R. 226.) In this context, there would
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have been no reason for Wardley to take the actions Bearden identifies in an effort to
make it appear like Wardley - as opposed to Gritton - did something or failed to do
something of consequence.
Wardley providing Gritton an office, and business cards and forms with Wardley's
logo, are not enough to "cloak" Gritton with apparent authority. Bodell, 945 P.2d at 124.
In Bodell, a title insurance company, First Title of Utah, Inc. ("First Title"), handled a
closing, issuing a title insurance policy underwritten by Stewart Title Guaranty Company.
First Title's agreement with Stewart Title expressly stated that while First Title could
handle closing escrows, it could not "represent to the public that it is an agent of [Stewart
Title] in the conduct of the escrow business." 945 P.2d at 122. First Title handled a
transaction which involved, among other things, a "double" escrow allowing the sale
price to be inflated, concealing a commission to a related party. Id. Although Stewart
Title allowed First Title to use Stewart Title's name on First Title's letterhead, title
policies, and settlement statements, the court determined that "[a]ny appearance of
authority to act as Stewart Title's agent in escrow, closing, or settlement transactions
came from First Title, not Stewart Title." Id. at 124. The court went on to note that "if
plaintiffs really believed that First Title was acting as Stewart Title's agent for settlement,
escrow, or closing transactions, then they were under an obligation to ascertain the scope
of that agency." Id. Like Wardley in this case, Stewart Title never had any contact with
the plaintiffs. Id. at 122.
In addition, there is no evidence that Wardley had "knowledge of and
acquiescence in" Gritton's actions. Wardley was unaware of Gritton's prior relationship
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with Bearden. Wardley cannot be held responsible for knowing or understanding that
Bearden would place so much trust in Gritton that she would not read documents7 - in
essence throwing caution to the wind.
When an agent is authorized to act as an agent for limited purposes, the agent's
actions which go well beyond those actions cannot bind the authorizing entity, absent
some action on its part. The focus of the inquiry is on what Wardley did; not what
Gritton did; on what Wardley knew; not what Gritton knew.
The only things Wardley did here (based on the marshaled facts) was:
•

be recognized as a reputable real estate broker;

•

hire Gritton;

•

provide him with forms for listing properties (but not for transferring title);

•

maintain a transaction file on the REPC between Gritton and Bearden, making
Wardley aware that Gritton was acting as both Wardley's real estate agent
representing the seller and as buyer;

•

never calling Gritton about his violating its policy against buying properties he
was listing;

•

never contacting Bearden and offering to provide Bearden with an alternate
agent or asking another agent to step in and represent Bearden;

•

maintain a trust account for this transaction

The Listing Agreement (Tr. Ex. 4) states in bold at the top:
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT - READ
CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING.
In addition, Bearden was no novice at real estate transactions and well knew the
significance of a document needing a notarized signature. (R. 707 at 64.) When she
noticed that something needed to be notarized (R. 707 at 28-29), she testified that she
trusted Gritton (R. 707 at 64); trusted him because she knew him and his family. (Id.)
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• be aware that Gritton failed to make the earnest money payment to Bearden, as
required by the REPC; and
• never calling Bearden about this problem.
Wardley was unaware of the fraud and, because Gritton was misrepresenting the
transaction to Wardley. (See e.g. R. 708 at 226 (Wardley was advised that the transaction
with Bearden had failed).) There is no basis to impute Gritton's knowledge to Wardley.
Because the REPC in Wardley's file indicated that Gritton was paying the full asking
price, "[t]here were no terms in there that would cause alarm." (R. 708 at 195.)
(Wardley was unaware that the price had been reduced by 6% so Bearden could avoid
paying a commission. (Tr. Ex. 8; R. 707 at 60-61,136.))
C.

Problem With "Agent" Jury Instructions,

The difficulty here is that the lower court's instructions to the jury were
unnecessarily confusing with respect to the issue of Gritton's actions and statements
being equated with the actions and statements of Wardley - in a way that was prejudicial
to Wardley. The court correctly instructed the jury that Wardley's liability for Gritton's
actions as its "agent" was limited:
A principal is liable to others for the acts or omissions of the
agent, if the agent was acting within the scope of the agent's
employment or in the course of carrying out the agent's express
duties at the time the claim arose.
Instruction No. 36, Liability of Principal for Acts of Agents (R. 460) (emphasis added).
(For the same reasons articulated above, Wardley cannot be held liable for Gritton's
actions as they were outside of the scope of his agency.)
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In an earlier instruction, however, the trial court had told the jury that Gritton's
acts could bind Wardley because "Wardley Corporation is a corporation and, as such, can
act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents."
Instruction No. 23, Corporation Acts Through Its Agents (R. 446) (emphasis added).
The use of the word "agents" in the factual context of this case - dealing with
independent contractor real estate agents - was prejudicial. Clearly, Gritton is not the
type of corporate agent who can bind Wardley in the general context of Instruction
No. 23. However, no one told the jury that "agent" meant something different in the
context of this instruction.
Thus, all of the instructions which focus on Wardley's actions or knowledge are
tainted by the jury's having been instructed that Wardley, as a corporation, "can act only
through its . . . agents," of whom Gritton was one. See Instruction No. 26(A), Fraudulent
Omission - Confidential or Fiduciary Relationship (R. 450); Instruction No. 28,
Intentional or Reckless Misrepresentation (R. 452 ("whether Guy Gritton made a
deliberate misrepresentation") (emphasis added)); Instruction No. 29, Statement of
Opinion of Belief (R. 453 ("whether the defendants' statement was a representation of
fact") (emphasis added)); Instruction No. 32, Material Fact (R. 456 ("whether Guy
Gritton's statement related to a material fact") (emphasis added)); and Instruction

Instruction No. 23 is identical to and obviously was taken from the Model Utah
Jury Instructions ("MUJI") No. 25.1. The model instruction cites only Radio Corp. of
Am. v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1970). That case involved a
defense of want of authority based on a corporation's assertion that its president lacked
authority to enter into the contract at issue.

AO

No. 33, Intent to Induce Reliance (R. 457 ("whether Guy Gritton intended to
induce . . . . " "whether Guy Gritton made the representation

" "It is sufficient if the

defendant made a misrepresentation . . . . " ) (emphasis added).)
The instructions so inexorably bound Wardley to Gritton and used "Gritton" and
"defendant" so interchangeably that the jury was confused. So confused that they sought
clarification on this point - resulting in another procedural misstep by the trial court.
D.

Gritton's Conduct Was Outside The Scope of His Subagency.

For the same reasons articulated in connection with Wardley's scope of
employment argument, above, Gritton's conduct was not within the scope of his
subagency relationship with Wardley. Wardley is not liable for every conceivable act its
subagent might commit. Rather, as the rule of law states, Wardley can only be found
liable "if the agent was acting within the scope of the agent's employment or in the
course of carrying out the agent's express duties." Instruction No. 36, Liability of
Principal for Acts of Agents (R. 460). See also Phillips, 666 P.2d at 882 (the action
complained must be in "reference to the principal's affairs entrusted to the subagent").
As noted above, an agent's function - and therefore the scope of his authority and the
limit of his principal's liability - can be limited. Bodell Construction Co. v. Stewart Title
Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("First Title is Stewart Title's agent for the
limited purpose of issuing title insurance policies and commitments." (Emphasis
added)); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988).
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III.

WARDLEY CANNOT BE HELD DIRECTLY LIABLE FOR THE
RESULTS OF GRITTON'S FRAUD.
Bearden sought and the jury found Wardley was directly liable for Gritton's fraud

based on a breach of fiduciary duty theory. In addition, the jury held Wardley directly
liable for punitive damages.
A.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

Because of the confusion created by the jury instructions, it is not certain whether
the jury decided this issue based on Gritton's actions or Wardley's. The only witness
with a significant background in real estate matters, Jeff Sommers, testified that even
with hindsight, Wardley could not have seen Gritton's fraudulent scheme coming.
(R. 708 at 196.) No other witness testified as to the standard of care that governs real
estate professionals or what Wardley should have done. The jury was left to fend for
themselves, apparently grabbing onto Bearden's suggestions that she should have been
called or another agent should have intervened when Wardley became aware Gritton was
buying the property. (Id. at 224.)
However, any concerns raised about Gritton buying a property he had listed were
alleviated by the fact that it appeared from the information Wadley had that the full
purchase price was being paid. {Id. at 194-96, 226.) In addition, Wardley did not react to
this transaction because, a victim itself of Gritton's fraud, it had been told the deal had
fallen through. (Id.)

AA

Without any evidence of duty, there can be no determination of a breach. Without
a breach, the claims against Wardley must fail with regard to the breach of fiduciary duty
claim.
B.

There Was No Basis for the Jury's Award of Punitive Damages
Against Wardley.

There is no basis for the jury's award of punitive damages against Wardley.
1.

Because Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Recover On Any of Its
Theories, Wardley Cannot Be Liable for Punitive Damages,

As discussed in detail above, Wardley should have been granted summary
judgment or a directed verdict on Bearden's claims against it. The evidence presented
was not sufficient to hold Wardley liable for Gritton's fraud, and there is no evidence that
anyone else at Wardley acted willfully or recklessly toward Bearden. Once Bearden's
theories of liability are discounted, there is no basis for imposing punitive damages on
Wardley.
2.

There Was No Basis for Finding Wardley Liable for Punitive
Damages,

Even if Wardley could be held vicariously liable for Gritton's conduct, punitive
damages still should not have been awarded against Wardley, either on the basis of its
own conduct, or based on Gritton's conduct.
Questions 8 and 9 of the Special Verdict put the issue of punitive damages to the
jury - Question 8 for Gritton; Question 9 for Wardley. (R. 473-74.) Accordingly, there
is no doubt that Wardley was being held responsible for punitive damages based on its
own conduct, not that of Gritton; and for conduct in addition to and separate from

2474^4_2

4S

Gritton's. Question 9 asks: "do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts
or omissions of Wardley were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that
manifested a knowing reckless indifference toward, and a disregard for, the rights of Mr.
and Mrs. Bearden?" (R. 474.)
Similarly, the Addendum to Special Verdict put the issue of the amount of
punitive damages to the jury - Question 1 for Gritton; Question 2 for Wardley.
(R. 475-76.) Question 2 of the Addendum to Special Verdict states: "If you answered
Question 9 of the Special Verdict "Yes" you may award a sum which, in your judgement
[sic], would be reasonable and proper punishment to Wardley for its treatment of Mr. and
Mrs. Bearden, and as a wholesome warning to others not to offend in a like manner."
(R. 475-76.) The jury answered Question 9 "yes", and awarded $15,000 in punitive
damages against Wardley.9 This was error.
As a corporation, Wardley can act only through its agents - its officers and other
employees.10 Stratton v. West States Constr., 440 P.2d 117, 118 (Utah 1968). However,
a corporation is not automatically liable for punitive damages simply because someone in
the corporation committed a bad act, and acted willfully or recklessly in doing so.
Rather, the person committing the act must have been sufficiently high-up in the
corporation to justify holding the corporation responsible. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763

9

The jury separately awarded $25,000 in punitive damages against Gritton.

10

Jury Instruction No. 23 prejudiced Wardley because Gritton was not an agent for
this purpose. That is, it is highly likely that the jury was confused by the instruction that
a corporation can act only through its agents when Gritton was always referred to as
Wardley's agent. However, Gritton was not an agent for this purpose.
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P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court adopted Section 909 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts for the test of whether punitive damages can properly be awarded
against a master or other principal (i.e., a corporation) because of an act by an agent. Id.
at 779. Under the Restatement such liability can be imposed only if:
(a) the principal or managerial agents authorized the doing and
the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent
was reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
Id. at 776-77; see also Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991).
Satisfaction of one of these factors is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages
against a corporation. Someone at a managerial level must have authorized the act,
committed the act, ratified the act, or been reckless in employing the lower-level agent
that in fact committed the act. Under Utah law, there is no other basis on which to
impose punitive damages on a corporation. See also Flint Hills Rural Elec. Coop. v.
Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co., 941 P.2d 374 (Kans. 1997) (characterizing Restatements
Section 909 "complicity rule" as one of direct, not vicarious liability.)
Applying the Utah Supreme Court's rule in Johnson to this case, there was no
basis on which to impose punitive damages against Wardley. The only evidence
regarding willful, malicious, or reckless conduct went to Gritton. There is no evidence
that anyone associated with Wardley, other than Gritton, acted in a culpable manner.
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(See R. 708 at 196 (even in retrospect, nothing would have alerted Wardley to a problem
on this transaction).) Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that
would tend to show Gritton was a managerial level agent of Wardley, or that someone at
a managerial level in any way ratified what Gritton had done. Similarly, there is no claim
made that Gritton's conduct was authorized by any of Wardley's managerial agents, that
Gritton was unfit, or that any of Wardley's managerial agents were reckless in hiring or
retaining Gritton.11 In fact, Gritton came to Wardley with an excellent reputation.
(R. 708 at 183-84.)
In sum, the evidence shows that Gritton was the only person who may have acted
willfully, recklessly, or maliciously. His actions cannot be imputed to Wardley for the
purposes of punitive damages. Therefore, the jury's award of punitive damages should
be set aside.
IV.

OTHER PROBLEMS
A.

Problems with the Special Verdict Form

The Special Verdict was prejudicial to Wardley for several reasons. Most notably,
the Special Verdict instructs the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard for
determining fraud. In addition, it compounds the confusion created by the Jury
Instructions as to the roles of Gritton and Wardley.

11

Interestingly, although Bearden alleged that Wardley was liable for not adequately
supervising Gritton (R. 80-101 at ff 93, 98 and 111), and submitted jury instructions on
the issue of negligent supervision (R. 387-88), the requested instructions were not given
to the jury by the trial court. (R. 423-70.) None of the instructions dealt with any claim
of reckless hiring or retention of Gritton. (Id.)
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1.

The Special Verdict Form Asks the Jury to Apply an Incorrect
Evidentiary Standard.

The Special Verdict form used by the trial court was prejudicial to Wardley
because it instructed the jury to apply an incorrect evidentiary standard. Specifically, the
introduction starts out by instructing the jury to answer the following questions "from a
preponderance of the evidence." (R. 471.) In Question #1, the Special Verdict form then
asks:
Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find that Mr.
Gritton defrauded Mrs. Bearden and/or breached a fiduciary duty
toward her in the transaction involving the home at 550 Adams
Street?
(Id.)
In addition to confusing the issues of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, this
compound question is significantly wrong because it instructs the jury to determine fraud
by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Utah law is very clear that fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 2001 UT 25, f 33, 21 P.3d 198; Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah
1985); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., Utah, 607 P.2d 293, 294-95 (1980) The Special Verdict
form proposed by Wardley made this distinction clear. (R. 413.)
2.

The Court Erred When It Did Not Notify or Call the Attorneys
Into Court to Consider Questions From the Jury.

As noted above, Question #1 asks whether "Gritton" defrauded Bearden. This
confuses Gritton's acts with those of Wardley. This problem with the Special Verdict
form was apparent in a question regarding Special Verdict Question #2 which the jury
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had. (R. 421.) This problem was accentuated by the trial court's failure to notify counsel
of the fact that a request for additional instruction had come in during jury deliberations.
The determination of the propriety of a trial court's communication with a jury
during deliberations is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and the trial court
will be reversed only if the error is "substantial or prejudicial... such that the result
would have been different had it not taken place." Board of Commissioners of the State
Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Utah 1997)(quoting Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438,
441 (Utah 1979)).
During its deliberations, the jury raised a question regarding Special Verdict
Question #2. The jury asked the following two questions:
(1) Does "acts" means all or any one of the offending actions of
Mr. Gritton;
(2) Does "acts" refer only to the "defrauding and/or fiduciary
duties of Mr. Gritton."
(R. 421.) In response, the trial court wrote back:
The term "acts" is intended to refer to the alleged offending
conduct described in Ques. #1 only.
(R. 422.)
Rule 47(n) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for
deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part
of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of
law arising in the cause, they may require the officer to conduct
them into court. Upon their being brought into court the
information required must be given in the presence of, or after
notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given
in writing or stated on the record.
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This rule was at issue in Board of Commissioners of the State Bar v. Peterson, 937
P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997). There, the jury submitted a written question to the judge
regarding jury instructions relating to the definition of "the practice of law" and "the
unauthorized practice of law." Id. at 1271. The jury asked whether the definitions in the
instructions were to be recognized as law or as the judge's opinion. Id. Without notice to
either attorney, the judge responded to the jury in writing as follows: "The law as written
in the instructions and as read to you by the court is binding upon you, the jury. A jury
decides the facts and applies them to the law." Id. Before the jury returned with a
verdict, the attorneys came back to the courtroom, and the judge read the jury's question
to them as well as the judge's response. Neither attorney raised any objections. On
appeal, Peterson claimed that the trial court erred in its response to the jury's inquiry
during deliberations, arguing that under rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court should have at least notified the attorneys before responding to the jury. Id. at
1270.
Although the Utah Supreme Court held in Peterson that the error was harmless, in
this case, the court's sua sponte instruction was not. Here, the jury's question indicates
that it was confused about the very jury instructions to which Wardley had attempted to
object and now complains about. The trial court's failure to notify the parties of the
jury's question was harmful because it failed to give the attorneys a chance to get at the
source of the jury's confusion. The Special Verdict was unclear and confusing, as
illustrated by the jury's question regarding its meaning.
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B.

Amount of Damages,
1.

The Jury's Damage Award is Not Supported By the Evidence.

Even if this Court upholds the jury's determination that Wardley is vicariously
liable for Gritton's conduct, the damages award should be set aside or remitted.
Although juries are generally allowed wide discretion in their assessment of damages,
those damages must still be supported by competent evidence. See Cornia v, Wilcox,
898 P.2d 1379, 1386 (Utah 1995) (on appeal, the court "view[s] the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury's findings and will uphold the jury's calculation of damages,
so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it.") (additional citations omitted). In
this case, the damages award is not so supported. Rather, the basis of the damages award
is a mystery, with the final figure appearing to have been pulled out of thin air.
The Special Verdict asked the jury to "state the amount of damages, if any,
suffered by the Bearden as a proximate result of the Defendants' conduct." (R. 473.)
The jury hand wrote in an amount of $75,000. (Id.) However, the evidence in the record
supports an award of only $59,621.15, the amount of money Harold Bearden borrowed to
pay off the loans Gritton took out using the property as collateral. This is shown when
the evidence supporting the award of damages is marshaled. The following facts could
conceivably support the award of damages:
1. In order to avoid foreclosure, Bearden's husband, Harold Bearden, was
required to take out two loans. (R. 707 at 94-97.) These loans were used to
pay off the loans Gritton had taken out using the property as collateral. The
first loan was in the amount of $50,000. (R. 420, Tr. Ex. 21.) The second
loan was in the amount of $9,621.15. (Id., Tr. Ex. 22.)
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2. Harold Bearden's loans were variable interest rate loans charging rates of
8% to 10^2% (R. 707 at 98.)
riarold Bearden testified that each time he got a notice from the bank, the
interest rate would be higher, but did not produce the statements from the
bank. (Id. at 98,100.)
A Harold Bearden testified that he had paid $8,000 to $10,000 interest on the
loans. (Id. at 98-99.)
5. The loans were paid off within 18 months when Harold Bearden sold other
property to pay them off. (Id.)
uucille Bearden testified that at the time she and Gritton were conducting
their initial negotiations regarding the purchase of the house by Gritton, she
was renting it for $600 to $625 per month. (Id. at 10-11.)
7 Gritton lived in the house for approximately 13 months, moving out on
November 3, 1998 (Id. at 38.)
8. The purchase contract with Gritton set rent in the amount of $400 per
month for five years. (R. 420, Tr. Ex. 8.)
uucille Bearden testified that after Gritton moved out and the Beardens
fixed up the house it rented for $850 to $900 per month. (R. 707 at 38-39.)
2

Bearden's Own Motion Could Not Discern the Basis for the
Jury's Damage Award.

The fact tl iat the $75,000 damages award agaii ist ft a i dk > and Gi itton is not based
on the evidence in the record was acknowledged in Bearden's own Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and Prejudgment Interest
("Motion for Attc >i ney's Fees"), filed aftei tl u i verdict was reti n i led (R 482-85.) There,
Bearden divined that the jury made the following calculation when it wrote $75,000 on
the Special Verdict form, stating:
•
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"Plaintiffs estimate that $59,719.00 of the damages were awarded as
compensation for money borrowed by the plaintiffs' to pay off two
loans taken by Gritton." (R. 484 (emphasis added).)
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Wardley does not contest that the evidence generally supports this figure.
Bearden's Motion for Attorney's Fees then stated:
•

"Plaintiffs further estimate that $7,600.00 of the damages were
awarded as compensation for rental income lost as a result of Gritton
and Wardley's actions." (R. 484 (emphasis added).)

This estimate is problematic because nowhere in the jury's verdict does there appear a
basis for holding Wardley vicariously liable for rent Gritton did not pay during the
approximately 13 months he lived in the house. Furthermore, even if there was such a
basis, the $7,600 figure does not take into account the fact that Gritton paid the Beardens
$3,200 in rent under the purchase contract. Specifically, Lucille Bearden testified that
Gritton paid rent from October of '97 through May of '98. (R. 707 at 33.) Since he
moved out in November of '98, (Id. at 38), this resulted in six months of unpaid rent at
$400 per month for a total of $2400. This figure bears no reasonable relationship to the
$7,600 figure.
Bearden's Motion for Attorney's Fees added lost rent to the amount of the loans to
reach the total of $67,319.00 in damages. They then add:
•

"Prejudgment interest of 10% on that amount from May 21, 1998, (the
date on which Gritton took out the second of his two loans) through
September 6, 2001, (the date on which the jury's verdict was reached)
totals $14,883.00." (R. 484.)

•

Since this amount totals in excess of what the jury actually awarded
($67,319.00 + $14,883.00 = $82,202.00), Bearden asked that the
difference between the $14,883.00 calculated as the amount of interest

12

The evidence was that there were two loans in the amount of $50,000 (R. 420, Tr.
Ex. 21) and $9,621.15 (Id., Tr. Ex. 22). These two loans therefore only total $59,621.15.
The difference of $97.85 is only significant in terms of the confusion it reflects in the
record relating to the amount of damages awarded by the jury.
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the jury should have awarded and the $7,680.00 Bearden assumed the
jury had already awarded as interest ($75,000 - $67,319.00) - or
$7,203.00 14 -be added to the jury award. The trial court's final
judgment reflects this calculation. (R. 643-44.)
Again, this calculation is problematic. According to the plaintiffs, there were
damages in the amount of $67,319.00 for money borrowed to pay off the loans, and lost
rental income. To this, plaintiffs add prejudgment interest It is impossible to determine,
hn\yr\n nli\ ifu1 inii'ii»M is drln mined fiom the date Gritton took out the second of his
two loans. In fact, Bearden's damage would only have occurred from the date Harold
Bearden took out the loans to pay off the loans initially taken out by Gritton. And, as
Harold Bearden testif ied he pi obabl) paid only $8,000 to $10,000 in interest at a rate tl lat
there is no evidence of. (No bank statements or other corroborating evidence was
introduced to substantiate these figures.) Thus, the $14,883.00 figure is in reality, not
tied to any evidence in the record.
Ilie filial problem with the jury's damages award is that the was no way for the
jury to account for damages caused by the settling defendants, Backman Stuart Title
Company, Charlene Burns-Nielson, and the Old Republic Surety Group. Whereas
Wardley's proposed Special Verdict for iii cleai !;> asked tl: ic ji it ;; to state what percentage
of the negligence was attributable to each party (R. 419), there was no way for the jury to
do so in the Special Verdict form used by the trial court (R. 471-76.) Failure to account

Bearden's math was off $75,000 - $67,319.00 actually totals $7,681.00.
The correct number should have been $7,202.00. See footnote 2, above.
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for the damages caused by the settling parties may have led to a double recovery for
Bearden.
With all of the errors made in the instant case, the damages award in this case is
similar to the one that was set aside as not supported by competent evidence in Cornia v.
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). There, the plaintiffs brought an action for the loss of
and damage to their cattle that grazed on defendant's property. Id. at 1381. The jury
awarded damages for 90 cows at a rate of $715 each, which was the average market price
for a pregnant mature cow. Id. at 1386. On appeal the defendant argued that the jury
could not conclude that every missing cow should have been returned pregnant and that a
fifty percent pregnancy rate was the only rate supported by the evidence. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court agreed, stating that even plaintiff's own expert conceded on crossexamination that an unknown number of nonpregnant cows must be expected, resulting
in a corresponding deduction in value per head. Id. In light of this, and because there
was no other evidence supporting a 100% pregnancy rate, the court concluded that the
jury's calculation of damages was not supported by competent evidence, and that the
defendant was entitled to a remittitur. Id. The same conclusion should be reached here.
The evidence in the record supports damages only in the amount of the loans taken out by
Harold Bearden. In the event this Court upholds the jury's imposition of vicarious
liability against Wardley, Wardley is at least entitled to have the damages award
accurately reflect the damages sustained by the Beardens. Therefore, the damages award
should be set aside, or at the very least remitted to the trial court for redetermination.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of summary judgment and motion for
directed verdict shoi lid be re^ • ersed ai id tl le jiii > v ei diet ai id the judgment based thereon
should be overturned.
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